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MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
PARENT-CHILD TORT IMMUNITY-NO IMMIN1TY
FOR THE NONCUSTODIAL PARENT
Fugate v. Fugate'
Harold and Verla Mae Fugate were divorced in 1972. The custody
of Denise, their only child, was awarded to Verla Mae. Harold paid child
support and exercised the visitation and temporary custody rights he
had been granted by the divorce decree. On March 15, 1974, Verla Mae
was killed while riding as a passenger in an automobile operated by Harold.
Liability insurance was in effect on the car at the time of the accident.
After her mother's death, the care and custody of Denise were assumed by
her father.
In 1974, Denise, by a next friend, brought an action against her father
for the alleged negligent wrongful death of her mother.2 The defendant
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the action was barred by
the doctrine of parental immunity.3 The circuit court held an evidentiary
hearing on the motion to dismiss. The court found that there had been in6
disruption in the relationship between Harold and his daughter because
of the filing of the wrongful death action, but sustained the motion to
dismiss on the belief that parental immunity barred the suit. Denise ap-
pealed to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Springfield District. That court
1. 582 S.W.2d 663 (Mo. En Banc 1979).
2. The action was filed pursuant to RSMo § 537.080 (1978), which provides
in part:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by a wrongful act,
neglect or default of another, and the act, neglect or default is such as
would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to main-
tain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, then, and in
every such case, the person who... would have been liable if death had
not ensued shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the
death of the person injured, which damages may be sued for and re-
covered
(1) By... minor children... of the deceased. (Emphasis added.)
3. The rule barring an action by a child against her parents for personal
injuries seems to be a product of late nineteenth and early twentieth century
American jurisprudence. E.g., Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 376, 282 A.2d 351, 353(1971). Citing no authority, the Supreme Court of Mississippi gave birth to the
parental immunity rule in Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891)(action by married daughter against mother's estate for injury due to false im-
prisonment in an insane asylum). The Hewlett rule was followed in McKelvey v.
MeKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903) (action by child against father
and stepmother for "cruel and inhuman treatment"), and probably reached its
height of rigidity in Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905) (daughter
tried to recover in a battery action against her father who had been convicted
and sentenced for forcibly raping her). "The Hewlette [sic], McKelvey and Rol-
ler cases constitute the great trilogy upon which the American rule of parent-
child tort immunity is based." Akers &: Drummond, Tort Actions Between Mem-
bers of the Family-Husband & Wife-Parent & Child, 26 Mo. L. Racv. 152, 211(1961).
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RECENT CASES
recommended transfer to the Supreme Court of Missouri prior to opinion,
noting that the bench and bar needed more specific guidance as to the
application of the parental immunity doctrine.
The Supreme Court of Missouri held that "where the mother and
father have been divorced the parent who does not have the primary,
general, custody of the unemancipated minor child at the time the tort
occurs is not immune from -suit in tort by the child."4 This holding is
restricted to instances where the child's injury does not arise from the
exercise of- the noncustodial parent's temporary custody and visitation
rights.5 By so holding, the court created another in the already long list
of exceptions to the parental immunity rule.6
To understand the holding in Fugate, one must examine it in relation
to some of Missouri's earlier cases. The first Missouri Supreme Court case
using parental immunity to bar an action by an unemancipated child
against her parent was Baker v. Baker.7 In Baker the 15-month-old daugh-
ter of the defendant brought an action to recover for injuries negligently
inflicted when her father backed over her in an automobile. The court
4. 582 S.W.2d at 669.
5. We are also cognizant of the fact that a noncustodial parent must
perform parental duties of care, discipline, etc., when the child is in that
parent's temporary custody, and that the relative rights and duties of the
parties may result in a modification or denial of recovery when the in-
jury arises out of the performance of such duties. Those matters will have
to be adjudicated on a case-by-case basis. (Emphasis added.)Id.
6. In Missouri, parental immunity is .not recognized: (1) if the cause of
action involves a property right, Wells v. Wells, 48 S.W.2d 109, 111 (K.C. Mo.
App. 1932), cited in Fugate v. Fugate, 582 S.W.2d at 666 n.3; (2) when the child
is emancipated, Wurth v. Wurth, 322 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. En Banc 1959); (3) when
the child is suing a deceased parent's estate, Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d
68 (Mo. En Banc 1960); and (4) the immunity rule probably is not'recognized
when the alleged wrongful conduct is wilful or intentional, Baker v. Baker, 364
Mo. 453, 263 S.W.2d 69 (1953) (it is not absolutely clear what exceptions to the
immunity rule are within the holding of this case).
There are several exceptions to the immunity rule which Missouri has not
adopted. For example, some jurisdictions have held that the immunity rule does
not apply: (1) where the defendant has liability insurance, Sorensen v. Sorensen,
369 Mass. 350, 339 N.E.2d 907 (1975); (2) where the cause of action arises out of
an automobile accident, Lee v. Comer, 224 S.E.2d 721 (W. Va. 1976); (3) where
the defendant-parent injured the plaintiff-child while the parent was acting
within the scope of his employment, Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d
743 (1952); Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952); (4) where there
is a master-servant relationship between the parent and child, Dunlap v. Dunlap,
84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930); (5) where a carrier-passenger relationship existed
between the parties, Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939); Lusk v.
Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932); and (6) where the father is a member
of a partnership and his negligent activity is in furtherance of partnership busi-
ness, Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928 (Tex. 1971). This list illustrates that
courts are very result-oriented in this area and tend to be creative in finding
ways to avoid the immunity rule. See Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8, 10 (Alas. 1967);
Akers & Drummond, supra note 3, at 193; Annot., 41 A.L.R.3d 904, 964 (1972);
Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 1284, 1288 (1958); Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 423, 433 (1951).
7. 364 Mo. 453, 263 S.W.2d 29 (1953).
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held that the action was barred because: (1) "under the common law no
such actions could be maintained;" 8 and (2) "to permit such actions would
disturb the family relationship."9 The court held that when the theory
was "mere negligence"'10 there would be an absolute bar between parent
and child in actions for personal injury."
In Bahr v. Bahr,12 specifically referred to by the Springfield Court of
Appeals in recommending the transfer of Fugate to the Missouri Supreme
Court, a four-year-old child of divorced parents attempted to bring a
negligence action against her father for injuries suffered while the father
was exercising his right of "reasonable" visitation. The court held that the
action would be barred by the parental immunity doctrine unless in an
cvidentiary hearing the plaintiff could show that she was emancipated
8. Id. at 455, 263 S.WA.2d at 29. It is doubtful that the parental immunity
rule was part of the common law of Missouri prior to the Baker opinion. No early
English case dealing with parental immunity has been reported. McCurdy, Torts
Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARV. L. Rnv. 1030, 1059 (1930);
Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 423, 425 (1951). From this absence of authority, it has
been inferred that "there is no good reason to think that the English law would
not permit actions [by unemancipated minor children against their parents] for
personal torts." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF ToRTs 865 (4th ed. 1971).
Probably the most honest approach is to admit that no one knows the state of
the English law concerning parental tort immunity that Missouri adopted in
its reception statute. RSMo § 1.010 (1978). See Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352,
356, 150 A. 905, 907 (1930) ("The issue is, and must remain, an insoluble
mystery.").
Also militating against the proposition that parental immunity was part of
Missouri's common law prior to Baker is the relatively recent adoption of the
rule. In fact, the parent-child tort immunity rule was rejected in an action by
parent against child involving negligent injury in Wells v. Wells, 48 S.W.2d
109 (K.C. Mo. App. 1932). Contra, Brown v. Parker, 375 S.W.2d 594 (St. L. Mo.
App. 1964). The first Missouri case clearly embracing parental immunity is Cook
v. Cook, 232 Mo. App. 994, 124 S.W.2d 675 (Spr. 1939). For a history of the im-
munity rule in Missouri, see Akers & Drummond, supra note 3, at 211.
9. Baker v. Baker, 364 Mo. 453, 455, 263 S.W.2d 29, 29 (1953). For a dis-
cussion of the domestic tranquility rationale, see notes 25-42 and accompanying
text infra.
10. It is interesting to note how the court in Baker made use of precedents.
In Wells v. Wells, 48 S.W.2d 109 (K.C. Mo. App. 1932), the parent-child tort
immunity rule was rejected in an action by a parent against her child for negligent
injury. The Baker decision distinguished the Wells case from the facts in Baker
on the theory that Wells was decided in reliance on Dix v. Martin, 171 Mo. App.
266, 157 S.W. 133 (K.C. 1913). In that case an unemancipated minor was allowed
to recover for a "criminal and wicked" battery. Thus, the Baker court implied
that an action based on an intentional tort theory would not be barred.
The Baker decision also failed to mention Taylor v. Taylor, 360 Mb. 994,
232 S.W.2d 382 (1950), where a mother was allowed to bring an action against
her son for the wrongful death of her husband. The son was living at home with
his mother at the time the action was filed. Here the theory was "mere negligence"
and the action could have disrupted the familial relations, yet the court in
Taylor allowed the action because the son had reached majority.
11. Baker v. Baker, 364 Mo. 453, 458, 263 S.W.2d 29, 32 (1953).
12. 478 S.W.2d 400 (Mo. 1972). For a more extensive analysis of the Bahr
case, see MacDonald, Torts-Parental Immunity Doctrine in Missouri, 38 Mo. L.
RFv. 699, 704 (1973).
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within the breadth of Wurth v. Wurth'3 or that the action "would [not]
seriously disturb the family relations and thus [not be] contrary to public
policy."' 4
At first glance, because Bahr also involved divorced parents, Fugate
seems to overrule Bahr despite the fact that the Fugate opinion explicitly
states that it only modifies Bahr.'5 One distinction between Bahr and
Fugate is that the injury in Bahr arguably arose out of the performance of
a parental duty whereas the injury in Fugate clearly did not. The holding
in Fugate, allowing a cause of action to a child against her father, was
restricted to instances in which the child's injury does not arise out of
the exercise of the noncustodial parent's temporary custody and visitation
rights.16 If Bahr is still viable, a plaintiff is entitled to an evidentiary hear-
ing to determine whether family harmony will be disrupted by allowing
the suit in any case in which the parental immunity doctrine might be
invoked to bar the action.' 7
Fugate also brings into question the holding of Baker-that an un-
emancipated minor may not sue her parent for mere negligence. In Fugate,
the Missouri Supreme Court allowed an unemancipated minor to bring an
action under the wrongful death statute for negligence against her living
parent with whom she resided. Thus, after Fugate there is no situation
in which one would be absolutely certain that a Missouri court would apply
the parental immunity rule.
The plaintiff in Fugate unsuccessfully argued that Missouri's wrong-
ful death statute abrogated the "common law" doctrine of parental im-
munity by vesting a cause of action in minor children for the wrongful
death of a parent "in every such case" that the person would have been
liable if death had not ensued.' 8 In rejecting this argument the court
concluded that while the statute "could conceivably be construed to permit
a cause of action 'in every such case' . . . , we are of the opinion that the
legislature never intended the wrongful death act. . . to be an exception
to parental immunity."' 9 Some courts have expressed their hostility toward
parental immunity by ignoring the well-known canon of statutory con-
struction that statutes in derogation of the common law should be strictly
13. 322 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. En Banc 1959).
14. Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68, 70 (Mo. En Banc 1960). In
this case an unemancipated minor brought an action against her deceased mother's
estate. The court's reasoning, which is analogous to that used in Fugate, was that
the purpose of the parental immunity rule was to maintain domestic tranquility
in the family. Since plaintiff's mother was no longer living, there was no familial
relation between the unemancipated minor child and her mother for the suit to
disrupt. Therefore, the suit was allowed because it "would [not] seriously dis-
turb family relations and thus [is not] contrary to public policy."
15. 582 S.W.2d at 669.
16. See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
17. Bahr v. Bahr, 478 S.W.2d 400, 402 (Mo. 1972).
18. Missouri's wrongful death statute is set out in part in note 2 supra.
19. 582 S.W.2d at 667.
1980]
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construed.2 0 These courts have found it within the legislative intent to
abrogate the immunity rule when an action is brought under a wrongful
death statute even though that statute makes no reference to the immunity
doctrine.2 x
In fact, courts generally have been hostile to the immunity rule.
The "tendency has been to whittle away the rule by statute and by the
process of interpretation, distinction and exception, until what we have
left today is a conglomerate of paradoxical and irreconcilable judicial de-
cisions."2 2 "These exceptions reflect distaste for the injustices which often
result from a strict, pervasive application of the parental immunity rule."2
The law has now evolved to a point where many states do not use parental
immunity as a general rule; they have either formally abandoned the rule
or use it only in special circumstances.
2 4
20. R. DicKERsoN, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 206
(1975); 3 J. SuTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 61.01 (4th ed.
1974); R. Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARv. L. REv. 383 (1908).
21. Hale v. Hale, 312 Ky. 867, 230 S.W.2d 610 (1950); Minkin v. Minkin,
886 Pa. 49, 7 A.2d 461 (1939); Fowler v. Fowler, 242 S.C. 252, 130 S.E.2d 568
(1963). Contra, Horton v. Uniguard Ins. Co., 355 So. 2d 154 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1978); Durham v. Durham, 227 Miss. 76, 85 So. 2d 807 (1956).
22. Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 377, 282 A.2d 351, 854 (1971) (unemancipated
child who was passenger in automobile driven by her mother was injured in
collision with defendant Pados; Pados joined child's mother as a defendant).
For a list of some of the exceptions to the parental immunity rule, see note 6
supra. For an example of a statute abrogating the immunity rule in part, see
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.21 (Supp. 1977).
23. Streenz v. Streenz, 107 Ariz. 86, 88, 471 P.2d 282, 284 (1970) (uneman-
cipated child's mother drove automobile into tree, thereby injuring child).
24. In abrogating the parental immunity rule, the courts have reached dif-
ferent conclusions as to the breadth of the abrogation. Goller v. White, 20 Wis.
2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963), abrogated the immunity rule, except: "(1) where
the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of parental authority over the
child; and (2) where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of ordinary
parental discretion with respect to the provision of food, clothing, housing,
medical and dental services, and other care." Id. at 413, 122 N.W.2d at 198.
Supportive of this approach are Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alas. 1967) and
Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 471 P.2d 282 (1970).
Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich. 1, 199 N.W.2d 169 (1972), purported to follow
Goller, but the court abrogated the immunity rule only where the exercise of
parental authority or the provision of necessities is reasonable. Also supportive of
this position is Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1971). This raises the
problem of whether or not the court created a standard of care for parents in
areas in which the immunity is not abrogated. Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914,
921, 479 P. 2d 648, 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 293 (1971), did create a standard of
care peculiar to parents. "Thus, we think the proper test of a parent's conduct
is this: what would an ordinary reasonable and prudent parent have done in
similar circumstances?" (Emphasis in original.)
Another approach has been to abrogate the immunity rule where the al-
leged negligent conduct did not arise out of the family relationship and was not
connected with family purposes. Schenk v. Schenk, 100 Ill. App. 2d 199, 241
N.E.2d 12 (1968) (father brought action against unemancipated daughter for in-
juries he sustained when she negligently ran into him with an automobile).
Other courts have abrogated the parental immunity doctrine "absolutely."
Baits v. Balts, 273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966); Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H.
[Vol. 45
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The court in Fugate justified the parental immunity rule solely on
the ground that to allow actions between family members would "result
in disharmony or destruction of family relations."2 5 This seems to be a
retreat from the number of justifications that have historically been made
for the rule.2 6 Apparently two of the other traditional justifications, the
right of the parent to discipline his child and the possibility of collusive
suits, 27 are not "mere makeweights."2 8 Neither was relied on in Fugate.
In Bahr it was stated that the "preservation of the parent's right to
discipline his minor children has been the basic policy behind the rule
of parental immunity."29 This justification for the rule was not relied
on in Fugate, perhaps because it does not address how a parent's right to
discipline his child is applicable to negligence cases. Discipline is usually
administered intentionally; almost by definition one cannot negligently
discipline a child. Thus, in a negligence case such as Bahr or Fugate, a
parent's right to discipline the child seems irrelevant. Another possible
reason Fugate did not mention the right of the parent to discipline the
child is that the defendant, a non-custodial parent who was not exercising
any right of temporary custody, may not have had the right to discipline
his child.
Whatever the reasons, Fugate justified the immunity rule only on
the basis that to allow actions would disturb domestic tranquility. Although
traditionally this has been the strongest justification for employing the
432, 224 A.2d 588 (1966); Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192,
297 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969); Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971).
Still other courts either have never adopted the parental immunity rule or
have left the breadth of the abrogation undefined. Tamashiro v. De Gama, 51
Hawaii 74, 450 P.2d 998 (1969); Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013(1974); France v. A.P.A. Transport Corp., 56 N.J. 500, 267 A.2d 490 (1970);
Nuelle v. Wells, 154 N.W.2d 364 (N.D. 1967); Wood v. Wood, 135 Vt. 119, 370
A.2d 191 (1977). See also Annot., 41 A.L.R.3d 904, 964 (1972).
25. 582 S.W.2d at 668.
26. An examination of the opinions . . . discloses that . . . seven
reasons . . .have been given for denial of a personal injury action be-
tween parent and minor child: the position of the family as a quasi
governing unit; the husband-wife cases denying an action despite a
married women's statute; danger of fraud (stale claims asserted after ma-jority); possibility of succession (inheritance of amount recovered in
damages); family exchequer (financial detriment to other children);
disturbance of domestic tranquillity (although a reason sometimes sug-
gested of the danger of possible domestic collusion where there is liability
insurance is antithetical); and interference with parental discipline and
control.
McCurdy, Torts Between Parent and Child, 5 VILL. L. REv. 521, 528 (1960). For
an explanation of these rationales, see McCurdy, Torts Between People in Do-
mestic Relation, 43 H~Auv. L. Rv. 1030, 1072 (1930).
27. "When an action is brought against a parent, frequently it will be brought
at the instance of, or with the approval of, the parent with an eye toward re-
covery from the parent's already purchased liability insurance." Sorensen v. Soren-
sen, 369 Mass. 350, 362, 339 N.E.2d 907, 914 (1975).
28. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 361, 150 A. 905, 909 (1930) (contains a
good discussion of the traditional justifications for the rule).
29. Bahr v. Bahr, 478 S.W.2d 400, 401 (Mo. 1972).
1980]
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parental immunity rule, it is not in itself unassailable. First, the domestic
tranquility fostered by the immunity rule is based on "a procedural
disability of the child to sue ... and not from a lack of violated duty."30
The doctrine admits that the bar to the action is premised "on the theory
that an uncompensated tort makes for peace in the family."31 It seems
that the evil to be avoided by the immunity rule is the filing of the action
and not the underlying injury that gives rise to the suit. The assumption
that compensation of a wrong is more disruptive of family harmony than
the underlying wrong itself should be reexamined. Second, there never has
been a bar between parent and child for actions in property32 or contract;33
yet these kinds of disputes are sometimes more hostile than disputes among
family members in personal injury cases.3 4 The result of this distinction
is that the law protects "the property rights of a minor more zealously
than the rights of his person."35
The domestic tranquility justification is made even less defensible be-
cause of the interaction of liability insurance with tort law.36 It is im-
30. Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68, 73 (Mo. En Banc 1960). It re-
mains unclear why denying the cause of action on a "procedural disability" is
significant. Substantive rights cannot exist in the abstract; there must be some
procedural mechanism that will make the substantive right concrete. Therefore,
a "procedural disability" that denies any mechanism for the realization of the
right is essentially the same as a denial of the substantive duty.
31. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 866 (4th ed. 1971).
"When serious injury has occurred, harm to the relationship has occurred; ill-
feelings, however, may be lessened where reparation may be made." Tamashiro v.
De Gama, 51 Hawaii 74, 78, 450 P.2d 998, 1001 (1969). See also Gibson v. Gibson,
3 Cal. 3d 914, 919, 479 P.2d 648, 651, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 291 (1971); Sorensen v.
Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350, 360, 339 N.E.2d 907, 913 (1975); Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa.
372, 380, 282 A.2d 351, 355 (1971) ("it is the injury itself which is the disruptive
act").
32. Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8, 10 (Alas. 1967); Streenz v. Streenz, 106
Ariz. 86, 87, 471 P.2d 282, 283 (1970); Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 916, 479
P.2d 648, 649, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 289 (1971); Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921,
922 (Ky. 1971); Wells v. Wells, 48 S.W.2d 109, 111 (K.C. Mo. App. 1932); W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS 865 (4th ed. 1971); McCurdy, supra
note 8, at 1057.
33. Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 88, 471 P.2d 282, 284 (1970); Briere v.
Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 434, 224 A.2d 588, 590 (1966).
34. Wells v. Wells, 48 S.W.2d 109, 111 (K.C. Mo. App. 1932); Goller v.
White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 410, 122 N.W.2d 193, 197 (1963); McCurdy, supra note 8,
at 1075.
35. Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 410, 122 N.W.2d 193, 197 (1963).
36. When we consider the significance of the miscegenetic union [of tort
law and liability insurance] for social life, we find that although lawyers
and judges recognize the close relationship of liability insurance and the
tort process, they have not considered and are not aware of the full
implications of the relationship. If its importance is realized, it is not
stressed; remarkably little has been written on the subject. It is common,
even for those of us who know better, to continue to talk of "tort law"
as if the process to which personal injury claims were subjected in the
nineteenth century still were in effect. Our analysis of our claims system
follows a bifurcated path. On the one hand we examine the tort process
and on the other we examine the liability insurance institution. When we
[Vol. 45
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portant to note that the court in Fugate did not mention the existence of
liability insurance except in its enumeration of the relevant facts. In
Baker the existence of liability insurance was explicitly declared to be ir-
relevant to the issue of the viability of the immunity rule.37 The court's
silence in Fugate might be an indication that the Baker position is not
as tenable as it once was.
The existence of liability insurance has several effects which mitigate
the importance of the domestic tranquility rationale. First, where insur-
ance is nonexistent, it is doubtful that unemancipated minor children will
sue their parents.3 8 Second, where the practice of insuring is widespread
the domestic tranquility argument rings hollow, for "in reality the sought
after litigation is not between child and parent, but between the child
and the parent's insurance carrier."3 9 Thus, the "action between parent
and child is not truly adversary. ' 4 0 If the action is not really an adversary
proceeding between parent and child, then the disruptive effect of the
suit will be minimal.
A third effect that the presence of liability insurance has on the vi-
ability of the domestic tranquility rationale is that "with today's sky-
rocketing health costs" an injury to a family member is a fact "which often
works the greatest hardship on the family unit."41 In denying insurance
proceeds to compensate the family unit for its expenditures stemming
from the child's injuries, the parental immunity doctrine may create
greater disharmony in the family relations than already exists by plac-
ing a financial burden on the family unit that it cannot easily bear.42
The Missouri Supreme Court considered the injustice created by the
parental immunity rule and stated that under the facts in Fugate "the
family in its traditional sense already [had] been disrupted through di-
vorce prior to the time this action arose." 43 The court then concluded
that the filing of the action could not disrupt a domestic establishment
that had already been disrupted.
Deciding the case on the basis of protecting domestic tranquility
consider proposals for reform in the one or the other we rarely ask how
changes in the one will affect the other.
Smith, The Miscegenetic Union of Liability Insurance and Tort Process in the
Personal Injury Claims System, 54 CORNELL L. RIv. 645, 646 (1969) (citations
omitted).
37. 364 Mo. 453, 263 S.W.2d 29 (1953).
38. Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 88, 471 P.2d 282, 284 (1970).
39. Id.
40. Sorensen v. Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350, 362, 339 N.E.2d 907, 914 (1975)(Query: If the action is not a true adversary proceeding, does that necessarily
make it a collusive action?).
41. Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 380, 282 A.2d 351, 355 (1971).
42. "The child's suit, if successful, will provide a fund to care for its in-juries which might otherwise be unavailable. Far from upsetting family ties, the
suit is actually an incident in the course of a family's provident management of
its affairs." Badigian v. Badigian, 9 N.Y.2d 472, 479, 174 N.E.2d 718, 723, 215
N.Y.S.2d 35, 41 (1961) (Fuld, J., dissenting).
43. 582 S.W.2d at 669.
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presents some problems. First, the familial relationship between a father and
daughter is not always destroyed when the daughter's parents are di-
vorced. In the instant case there was an evidentiary hearing which found
a "harmonious relationship between defendant and his daughter."44 A
child does not stop having a congenial relationship with her noncustodial
parent just because her parents are divorced. Second, assuming that the
familial relationship between father and daughter was severed when the
general care and custody of Denise was granted to her mother, that relation-
ship was re-established after Verla Mae Fugate's death. By the time the suit
was filed, Harold had assumed the general care and custody of Denise. A
new family unit which consisted of plaintiff and her father was thus
established.
It is not clear why the court looked to the time the tort was committed
when evaluating the family unit since that family unit was not the domestic
establishment that would be disrupted by the filing of the suit. Since the
policy behind the rule is to prevent the disruption in family harmony
caused by the filing of the suit, it seems that one should look to the time
of filing as the crucial time for deciding what the family unit is.
The court's method of determining the family unit would raise a
number of additional problems and complexities in other fact situations.
For example, would the action be barred if a child's parents became di-
vorced after the child is injured by one of the parents, but before the
action is filed? What if a child's parents were divorced prior to the time
the child is injured, but the child's parents remarry prior to the time
the action is filed? At least in the latter situation, it seems that the
justification for the rule would be defeated if the family unit was de-
termined by using the Fugate analysis.
The concurring opinion in Fugate45 rejected the majority's "per se"
rule that after a child's parents have been divorced, an unemancipated
minor may bring an action against her noncustodial parent for injuries
that do not arise from the exercise of the noncustodial parent's temporary
custody and visitation rights. The concurring opinion based its conclusion
that the child could bring the wrongful death action on the fact that the
evidentiary hearing at the trial level showed "no disruption in the harmoni-
ous relationship between defendant and plaintiff because of the filing of
this action." 40 Since Fugate did not expressly overrule but only "modified"
the Bahr opinion,47 even under the majority opinion the plaintiff may
44. Id. at 664.
45. Then Chief Justice Morgan and Judge Rendlen joined in the con-
curring opinion written by Judge Donnelly. One may only speculate as to how
the recent personnel changes in the Missouri Supreme Court will affect the law
in this area.
46. 582 S.W.2d at 670 (Donnelly, J., concurring).
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still be entitled to an evidentiary hearing 48 to show that family harmony
will not be disrupted by allowing the suit whenever the defendant at-
tempts to invoke the parental immunity doctrine to bar the action.
49
It remains uncertain how the trial courts will decide whether to bar
a suit as a result of its findings in the evidentiary hearing. 9 If the action
has not caused any disruption (as was found in Fugate), then the action
should not be barred. If the action has already disrupted the domestic re-
lations, then, under the reasoning of the majority in Fugate, the action
cannot again disrupt those relations; thus, it should not be barred. In
other words, if the majority and concurring opinions in Fugate are carried
to their logical extremes, the suit will not be barred regardless of whether
the trial court finds disruption. Using this analysis, the only time a trial
court should bar an action is in the relatively rare case when it determines
that there has not yet been any disruption, but that family harmony will
be disrupted if the suit is allowed to continue.
Both the majority and concurring opinions fail to address another of
the plaintiff's contentions for reversal, namely, that the parental im-
munity rule should be abolished. In doing so the court failed to resolve
the underlying problem of the case, i.e., whether there should be a parental
immunity rule, and if so, when this rule should be applied. In the solution
of this problem, there should first be an examination of the social costs
and benefits of abrogating the parental immunity rule. The familiar social
goals or public policies behind tort law are advanced by allowing the
action, e.g., compensating the victim for his injuries and deterring the
parent from injuring the child. Some of the social costs of abolishing the
immunity rule are: the possibility of friendly or collusive suits; the ef-
fects of an increase in liability insurance rates; and any family disruption
48. Indeed, if one gets an evidentiary hearing, then it is plausible that the
existence of liability insurance may be admissible. However, in order to get this
admitted into evidence, the plaintiff would have to overcome the Baker decision
which explicitly declared that the existence of liability insurance is not admis-
sible because it is irrelevant in determining whether the parental immunity rule
should be applied. In Fugate, however, the court emphasized that an action
should not be barred if family harmony would not be disrupted by allowing the
suit. Therefore, one can certainly make a valid argument that the presence of
liability insurance is relevant because it lessens the adverseness and thus the dis-
ruption caused by the suit. To keep this relevant evidence out, the defendant
would have to show that its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value.
49. For a case granting an evidentiary hearing under Bahr, see Kiefer v.
Kiefer, 497 S.W.2d 851 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1973).
50. Intuitively it seems unlikely that an evidentiary hearing will be very
effective. Preservation of domestic tranquillity is the goal behind the immunity
rule, but having an evidentiary hearing to see if the filing of an action will dis-
rupt family relations may not promote that goal. Once an adversary proceeding
has begun-whether that proceeding is called an evidentiary hearing or not-it
seems likely that any additional acrimony or ill feelings that the suit creates
will be unleashed. On the other hand, if the evidentiary hearing is restricted to
avoid any disruption in family relations, there will not be enough evidence on
the merits to determine whether the suit will cause disharmony in the family.
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resulting from the filing of the suit beyond that already caused by the
underlying tort.
The cost of entertaining collusive suits may be a major problem, yet
there are at least two factors that might mitigate the effects of not barring
these potentially collusive actions. First, many liability insurance con-
tracts impose on the insurer a duty to defend.51 If an insurance company
is hiring the defendant's attorney, one can assume that the possibility of
collusive actions is lessened. Second, if one were to deny a cause of action
in all cases because there is the possibility that some future cases will be
collusive or fraudulent, then one would end up denying all causes of
action.5 2
The effects of an abolition of the parental immunity rule on the
liability insurance business are harder to discern. Presumably, allowing
tort actions between parent and unemancipated child would increase
homeowner's and automobile liability insurance rates since injury be-
tween parent and child is probably not infrequent. This increase in
insurance rates conceivably could have such adverse effects as causing
older homeowners or single unmarried automobile drivers to pay higher
insurance rates, though these groups are not likely to have unemancipated
children, or causing a greater number of persons to drive with inadequate
insurance coverage, thus increasing the number of accidents involving
judgment-proof drivers.
Consideration of the social costs and benefits described above is illustra-
tive of the analysis that should be used explicitly in determining whether
to retain the immunity rule.53 If the court finds that the benefits of
abolishing the immunity rule outweigh the costs, then it should abolish
the rule. If the social costs of abrogation outweigh the benefits of keeping
the rule, then the immunity rule should be retained. The use of halfway
measures, however, such as evidentiary hearings and the incessant creation
of judicial exceptions, only creates uncertainty and wasteful litigation.
Fugate may be the sounding of the death knell for the parental im-
munity rule as an absolute bar to an action. Here an unemancipated
minor child was allowed to sue the parent with whom she was living at
the time the-suit was filed, the underlying alleged wrong was negligence,
and there was the possibility-though never discussed by the court-that
this was a friendly suit. By permitting this action the Missouri Supreme
Court has certainly endangered the vitality if not the very existence of
51. This duty to defend may have adverse effects on the insured. See Smith,
supra note 36, at 656.
52. Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 920, 479 P.2d 648, 652, 92 Cal. Rptr.
288, 292 (1971).
53. One way to rationalize the holding in Fugate is to look at it in the
context of liability insurance. The narrow holding allowed plaintiff to recover,
but was not so broad as to effect a general increase in insurance rates. Thus, the
case can be read as striking a fragile balance between two social goals-compensa-
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this tort immunity. While the parental immunity rule may never be com-
pletely abrogated in Missouri, 54 the supreme court has indicated a willing-
ness to search for reasons not to invoke it.
PHILLIP K. GEBHARDT
54. Even in those jurisdictions where the parental immunity rule has been
abrogated, the policy rationales justifying the rule resurface when a court con-
siders the breadth of liability between parent and child. New York, a state which
has "absolutely" abrogated the parental immunity rule, recently denied recovcry
to a child by finding that a parent owed the child no "duty" of care for super-
vision. The court noted that in determining exactly what actions a child may
maintain against a parent, the policies justifying parental immunity come into
play, thus narrowing the kinds of actions a child may maintain against a parent.
Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 324 N.E.2d 338, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1974).
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